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The works of Hayek regarding the emergence and evolution of social norms have 
been, and remain today, evaluated in a very contradictory manner. They indeed give rise to 
debates regarding the coherence and relevance of the Hayekian analysis, and to theoretical 
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and analytical extensions that tend to validate all or part of Hayek’s propositions regarding the 
emergence of social norms. The debates regarding the coherence and the relevance of the 
Hayekian approach are based on the notion of group selection. They support the ideas, firstly 
that a contradiction exists between group selection and methodological individualism, and 
secondly that the notion of group selection is not relevant. It appears that these two aspects 
could be clarified further, the first by showing that the Hayekian subjectivism makes it 
possible to lift the contradiction between group selection and the fact that only individuals act, 
the second by showing that the reference to the notion of group selection, which is 
biologically controversial, can be very well founded in social sciences and in particular, 
economics. This idea, that the notion of group selection makes it possible to take the 
emergence and evolution of social norms into account is in fact validated by recent economic 
developments.  
This paper is organized as follows: in the first section we will show that the reference 
to the notion of group selection is not coherent with the other elements of the Hayekian 
concept. In the second section we will develop the idea that the recent works regarding the 
emergence and evolution of social norms partly validate the Hayekian propositions in this 
regard. In the third section we will highlight the weaknesses of Hayek’s analysis and propose 
methods to correct them.  
1. The Notion of Group Selection and the Coherence of the Hayekian 
Evolutionism  
The main criticism2 against Hayek is that he tries to balance the conception of evolution based 
on the notion of group selection with an individualist methodology. Vanberg (1986), Hodgson (1991), 
De Vlieghere (1994), or Witt (1994) believe, using very different theoretical approaches, that this 
undertaking is doomed to fail, and that this attempt renders his analysis of social evolution incoherent. 
In fact, the problem is to know whether Hayek proposes a conception of the selection unit that is 
coherent with the methodological rationale of his evolution theory. This criticism is reinforced by that 
of the analysis of the changes in Hayek’s work. In other words, his analysis of the improvement of the 
rules of conduct in a society, of the adoption of the best rules by groups that did not put them into 
action, and the mutation of the rules of conduct are considered unsatisfactory. De Vlieghere (1994) 
considers the rules of conduct to be abstract, or from a Hayekian perspective, unconscious, since the 
individuals are not aware that these are the best rules. How is it possible to implement rules if they are 
unknown by those who must adopt them? As for Ege (1992), he believes that, as Hayek seems to 
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believe, that human societies are characterized by the existence of abstract rules, and if the difference 
between an archaic society and an extended society is related to the distinction between concrete rules 
and abstract rules, then either the archaic society is not a human society or the nature of the difference 
between these two types of societies is not relevant.  
It is, in fact, tempting to consider that Hayek is unable to balance methodological 
individualism and the cultural selection of groups. Hence Vanberg (1986) believes that, under the 
Hayekian conception, there are no mechanisms that can ensure the replication of rules of conduct. For 
example, a free rider has no incentive to adopt altruistic rules of conduct. De Vlieghere (1991) is more 
radical when he states that Hayek cannot be considered a defender of an individualist view of the 
evolution of human societies. Sugden (1993) believes that it is not necessary for Hayek to turn to this 
notion and, in reality, he does not. Contrarily, Hodgson believes that, if the Hayekian view of 
evolution is incoherent, it is then necessary to abandon individualism and preserve the idea of group 
selection by completing it: 
 
“Hayek should be criticized, not for embracing group selection and eschewing a consistent 
individualism, but for failing to incorporate additional processes of selection above the group 
level, involving different types of institutions, including both market and non market forms.” 
(Hodgson [1991], p. 79). 
 
Our objective here is to show that the works of Hayek are not part of what we can refer to as classical 
individualism and that the individual and collective rules evolve according to different conditions. 
Hence, Hayek writes:  
 
“[T]he systems of rules of individual conduct and the order of action which results from the 
individuals acting in accordance with them are not the same thing.” (Hayek [1967], p.67). 
 
In a human society, the same as in an animal society, a certain number of individuals observe the 
common rules of conduct who, depending on the circumstances under which they live, produce action 
rules. The criticisms concerning the manner in which Hayek defines the selection unit underestimate 
the distinction between the social rules and the individual rules, however crucial for Hayek: 
“The genetic (and in a great measure the cultural) transmission of rules of conduct takes place 
from individual to individual, while what may be called the natural selection of rules will 
operate on the basis of the greater or lesser efficiency of the resulting order of the group.” 
(Hayek [1967], p. 67). 
The necessity of this distinction is based on the following reasoning (Hayek [1967], p. 68): 
1) The same group of action rules can be linked to different rules of conduct; 
2) A same group of individual rules of conduct can, under certain circumstances, result in a 
certain order of actions, and  produce a different order under other circumstances; 
3) It is not the regularity of the individual rules of conduct that determines the preservation of a 
group of individuals but rather the resulting order of actions;  
4) The selection of the different individual rules of conduct is expressed through the viability of 
the order they produce; 
5) The abstract rules are characterized by the fact that those who implement them do not know 
that they are implementing them, on the one hand, and on the other hand, that they allow them 
to create a social order; 
6) The concrete individual actions are always the joint product of “internal motivations” and 
external events acting on individuals’ behaviour (including the actions of other individuals); 
7) The existence of rules of conduct is not a sufficient condition for the action of individuals, 
there must be incentives (external) or motivations (internal) to act, and most often a 
combination of both;  
8) The is no relationship between what determines individual actions and the result of the 
coordination of these actions; 
9) The difference between the prescribed character of society and the regularity of the 
individuals’ actions of which it is comprised, is also expressed by the fact that the social order 
can be accompanied by an absence of regularity in the actions of certain individuals. 
This reasoning, which constitutes the essence of the Hayekian analysis of the difference between 
individual rules of conduct and social rules, suggests that the Hayekian conception of evolution is 
based on a subjective approach more than on an individualist vision. More specifically, Hayek’s 
proposed analysis of social evolution is based both on a subjective view and the role of social 
interactions.  
Hayek’s subjectivism is in the affirmation that knowledge is “essentially dispersed” (Hayek [1988]), 
and that it is impossible for individuals to communicate all the knowledge they possess. This is the 
reason why individuals, if they can understand the behaviour of others, are never able to explain it. 
This phenomenon is related to Hayek’s proposed analysis of the “primacy of the abstract” (Hayek 
[1978]). 
Social interaction, or more generally, interactions between individuals and their environment signify 
that individuals live in a society: they interact and must take this phenomenon into account when 
defining the action plans.  
 Given these considerations, the problem in performing an economic analysis and an analysis of other 
social sciences is analyzing the coordination of individual action plans that have specific cognitive 
abilities and that invoke socially defined rules of conduct. As such, O’Driscoll (1977) considers that 
Hayek’s works introduce a change in the object of economic analysis to define it as the problem of 
coordination of the individual action plans.  
Hayek’s problem can be presented as follows: 
If we presume that:  
1) Individuals act in accordance with the abstract rules of conduct they learn (in accordance does 
not mean that a one-to-one relationship exists between the rules of action and the rules of 
conduct); 
2) Individuals are subjects; they are specific and a significant part of their knowledge is 
idiosyncratic, which signifies that it is not transferable; 
3) Individuals interact with others and their environment; 
then: 
4) How is a social order possible and if it exists, what are the characteristics? 
Hayek’s answer is that a mutual adjustment process of individual action plans makes it possible to 
realize such an order.  
For such an adjustment to exist requires that individuals have certain common characteristics so that 
they understand and apprehend exterior reality in a similar manner. A detour using an analysis 
developed by Hayek regarding the construction and the evolution of individuals’ knowledge is 
therefore necessary.  
 
 
 
 
The Subjective View of Knowledge According to Hayek. 
Hayek develops his view of knowledge in a work that is also known by psychologists and 
neurobiologists as well as economists3: called The Sensory Order (1952), in which the author 
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develops certain ideas dating from the 1920s, a period during which he hesitated between studying 
psychology and economics. He later redoes the analysis in “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility” 
(1967) and in “Primacy of the Abstract” (1978). In these works, Hayek defends a connectionist4 
theory and considers that individuals implement production mechanisms for rules of action that are 
abstract, or in other words, unconscious5. The rules make it possible for individuals to “categorize” or 
“classify” the exterior mode: 
“What we call knowledge is primarily a system of rules of action assisted and modified by 
rules indicating equivalences and differences of various combinations of stimuli.” (Hayek, 
[1978], p. 41). 
“Action patterns” allow individuals to act and implement a process of selection of production 
mechanisms of these patterns even if we consider that, in general, our actions are related to our mind’s 
interpretation of the outside world. Individuals understand each other since they are equipped with 
similar systems for producing action patterns. Therefore, in a given context we can communicate and 
understand the actions of others “that may be physically different and we are unable to make a 
comprehensive list but we know that they “signify” the same thing”. (Hayek [1980a], p.62). 
Based on this system of abstract rules of action, individuals have experiences that determine their 
conception. A new conception is due to the fact that an outside event can be classified in an abstract 
category that subsumes impressions and helps us to bring order to the world. A new stimulus may also 
require a reorganization of the classification system but in all cases, a stimulus that cannot be 
classified is not perceived. This conception explains the fact that each individual has unique 
sensations and makes it necessary to consider it as a subject.  
In summary, for Hayek, on the one hand, individuals build mechanisms that produce action patterns 
and, on the other hand, they choose from these mechanisms those that make it possible to react to 
stimuli from the environment. 
Such an analysis is perfectly reproduced in several more recent works. Edelman, a Nobel prize winner 
in medicine, and neuroscience specialist, develops theories that validate Hayek’s works regarding the 
difference between the sensory and physical orders:   
“Perception is adaptive rather than strictly veridical.” (Edelman [1989], p. 28).  
“A closed universal description of objects is not available to an adaptive creature, even to one 
with concepts; there is no ‘voice in the burning bush’ telling that animals what the world 
description should be.” (Edelman [ibid], p.32).  
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5For example, in “The Primacy of the Abstract”, Hayek speaks of the relationship between the abstract character of a rule 
and the fact that it is unconscious.  
According to Edelman, individuals implement a hierarchy of directory structures, which are networks 
of neurons that allow individuals to categorize the world in a similar manner. Moreover, this process 
cannot be dissociated from degeneracy:  
“Degeneracy means that, given a particular threshold condition, there must in general be more 
than one way satisfactorily to recognize a given signal input. This implies the presence of 
multiple neural groups with different structures, each capable of carrying out the same 
function more or less well: degeneracy entails that some nonisomorphic groups must be 
isofunctional.” (Edelman [1989], p. 49) 
 
This possibility that nonisomorphic groups and iso-functionality exist cover what Hayek has in mind 
when he introduces the idea of “specification by superimposition”6, and it is on the basis of such an 
analysis that he can consider, firstly that individuals who have similar rules of action can understand 
each other, secondly, that they do no know that they are implementing them and thirdly and finally, 
that they are unable to tell others what their own unique rules of conduct are.   
At this stage of the analysis, we recognize the coherent character of the Hayekian subjectivism. In 
fact, it makes it possible to show at the same time, that individuals are unique as to their perceptions at 
a given moment depending on their past perceptions, which makes them difficult to transfer from one 
individual to another, that the unconscious character of the rules of conduct that guide their actions 
cannot be communicated and that, despite all, due to their cognitive organization, or methods for the 
production of abstract rules of conduct, they can understand other individuals’ actions. 
In this view, Hayek’s subjectivism is based mainly on the first two proposals with the third making 
the coordination of individual action plans possible.  
In fact, the moment we accept the Hayekian basis of conception of individual behaviour, the problem 
of coordination of individual actions becomes essential:  
“The key question for social scientist is how the various and diverse images of reality that the 
individual minds develop could ever be coordinated to one another.” (Boettke [1990] p. 41). 
 
Coordinating Individual Action Plans and Communicating Rules of Conduct 
                                                            
6 Barry Smith describes this classifying activity as “the central nervous system is an adaptive engine for the 
constant reclassification on many levels (including conceptual and emotional levels) of the legion of impulses 
proceeding in it at any moment. We create the world in which we live in the sense that there are, on the side of 
nerve-excitations, no fixed conceptual units able to mirror or picture corresponding (predetermined) elements of 
external reality in a one-to-one way. Only insofar as the nervous system has learnt to treat a particular stimulus 
event as a member of a certain class of events, can this event be perceived at all, for only thus can it obtain a 
position in the system of sensory qualities.” (Smith [1999], p. 110). 
To explain how individuals succeed in producing an order, based on defined individual actions, Hayek 
uses a notion of mutual adjustment. He also has access to an analysis of an auto-organization7 process. 
In other words, individuals act according to rules of conduct and they understand the actions of others, 
even if they are unable to explain these actions. They adjust their action plans according to the result 
of the combination of their actions with those of others.  
Such a process is possible only, on the one hand, if individuals have limited knowledge of their 
environment, and on the other hand, if they act without having first defined a common objective. This 
does not signify that common actions are absent from the Hayekian discussions. Hence, “the 
spontaneous macro-order elements are the numerous arrangements of individuals as well as the 
deliberate organizations.” (Hayek [1988], p. 37). He adds: “as the spontaneous order grows, so does 
the size of the units. More and more, these elements will no longer be economies of individuals but 
rather organizations such as firms and associations, as well as administrative bodies.” Certain rules 
that allow a social order to exist facilitate the constitution of deliberate organizations. However, the 
social order cannot be the result of deliberate will, since on the one hand, individuals’ actions are 
defined by rules of conduct that cannot, for the most part, be communicated because they are 
unconscious, and on the second hand, individuals have only a limited knowledge of their environment 
when they define their action plans. 
This explains that, for Hayek, the evolution of societies perceived as systems of rules of conduct must 
be understood as being the result of the integration of two different levels:  
 “On the one hand the more comprehensive order assisting the preservation of ordered 
structures on the lower level, and on the other the kind of order which on the lower level 
determines the regularities of individual conduct assisting the prospect of the survival of the 
individual only through its effect on the overall order of the society.” (Hayek [1967], p. 76). 
 
Such a process is essential since it tends to make the Hayekian theory of evolution coherent and it 
justifies that we cannot reduce Hayek’s conception of individualism to a “classic” version.  
We must now examine how the rules of conduct are communicated within a society. 
According to Hayek, rules of conduct are communicated from individual to individual. From this 
communication therefore arises the problem of the nature of the acquisition of knowledge. In fact, for 
him, individuals are not rational, in the sense that they do not respect the axioms of perfect rationality, 
but learn to become more and more informed: 
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“Learning how to behave is more the source than the result of insight, reason and 
understanding. Man is not born wise, rational and good, but has to be taught to become so.” 
(Hayek [1988], p. 21). 
 
The acquisition of knowledge is related to the fact that individuals have the ability to produce and 
modify their action patterns and they do so both by imitation and trial and error.  
The first type of acquisition of knowledge is the same as that proposed by Menger (1963) when he 
takes into account the emergence of organic institutions, individuals imitate the behaviour of those 
who succeed in satisfying their needs the best:   
“There is no better way in which men become enlightened about their economic interests than 
by observation of the economic success of those who employ the correct means of achieving 
their ends.” (Menger [1976], p. 261). 
  
This process of acquisition of knowledge is characteristic of the self-reinforcement of behaviours, or  
more generally, a process of positive feedback. Since the rules of conduct are imitated, they become 
generalized: 
“It would seem that the cumulative and self-enforcing aspect of institutions and routines relates to 
some kind of process of positive feedback. In this respect there is another contrast with orthodox 
economics, in which the formation of equilibrium relies upon negative feedback processes, such as 
diminishing returns to scale. Rather than equilibrium, positive feedback can engender such 
phenomena as lock-in (to use the modern parlance), where outcomes become frozen because of their 
self-reinforcing attribute (Arthur, 1985, [1989]). Such lock-in phenomena can thus be regarded 
sufficiently stable units of selection in an evolutionary process.” (Hodgson [1992], p. 293)8. 
 
Such a development can be perfectly applied to the Mengerian analysis of the emergence of 
institutions9. 
Hayek also believes that imitation is a type of essential learning10 but it does not reduce his analysis to 
a single process. It combines it in fact with a learning process of trial and error. This makes it possible 
                                                            
8 In this passage, Hodgson makes a reference to the works of Veblen. Ironically, the type of generalization 
process present for Menger and Hayek is of the same nature as that used by Veblen to explain the selection of 
thought habits. In fact, on the one hand, in Hayek (1992) we find an opinion for the less negative personality of 
Veblen and the quality of his services, and on the other hand Veblen firmly criticizes the works of Menger. 
9 For more developments on this subject, cf. Garrouste (1994). This analysis, for example, was redone in these 
terms by Klein and Selgin (2000). 
to take into account the correction of errors that allow individuals to realize a mutual adjustment 
process necessary for achieving a given situation.  
“This mutual adjustment of individual plans is brought about by what, since the physical sciences 
begun to concern themselves with spontaneous orders, or ‘self-organizing process’, we have learnt to 
call ‘negative feed-back’.” (Hayek, 1978, p. 184). 
The two learning processes mentioned, imitation and trial and error, allow the existence of a self-
organizing process that characterizes both the individual’s action plans and the selection of rules of 
conduct. First in fact, imitation allows for the transfer of rules of conduct from individual to individual 
while the second one allows for the adjustment of the action plans and correction of errors. Group 
selection is then based on the superimposition of two levels of selection: the individual level and the 
collective level. For the first level, the individual rules of conduct are selected. Using the existence of 
inherited cognitive abilities (genetic and social) the individuals learn to select efficient behaviour 
rules, which create a collective level of rules of conduct that are in turn selected to allow the group to 
survive and develop. The two following quotations seem to validate this analysis:  
“It is always some regularity in the behavior of the elements which produces, in interaction 
with the environment, what may be a wholly different regularity of the actions of the whole.” 
(Hayek [1967] p. 78) 
and, 
“If there exist recurrent and persistent structure if a certain type (showing a certain order), this 
is due to the elements responding to external influences which are likely to encounter in a 
manner which brings about the preservation of this order; and on this in turn, may be 
dependent the chances of individuals to preserve themselves.” (Hayek [1967], p. 78) 
Therefore, there is no incoherence in the Hayekian conception of social evolution as of the moment 
this dual selection process, individual and collective, is perceived. The superimposition of the two 
levels is related to the “strange loop” phenomenon that we find in Hofstädter (1990). It also conforms 
to the Hayekian view of dual autonomy, that of the modern individual, otherwise released from all 
connection to traditional subordination, the State and society conceived as one and that of society that 
seems to have its own life and foreign even to those who are part of it. (Dupuy [1992], p. 247). 
 
2. The Relevance of the Hayekian Analysis of Social Norms 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
10 “The chief error of contemporary ‘sociobiology’ is to suppose that language, morals, law , and such like, are 
transmitted by the genetic process  that molecular biology is now illuminating, rather than being the products of 
selecting evolution transmitted by imitative learning.” (Hayek [1988], p. 24). 
Recent economic literature on the emergence of social norms, makes it possible to reconsider 
the Hayekain proposal according to which the most efficient social norms (or rules) for 
groups are selected. The examination however has its problems.  
Firstly, Hayek makes a reference to several forms or types of social norms, which makes the 
comparison with contemporary approaches, generally more precise regarding the social norms 
to which they refer (social norms, conventions, individual/collective moral norms etc.), more 
difficult. 
Hayek proposes a taxonomy of the types of collective behaviour rules that make it possible to 
identify the conflicts of interest between individuals and the group (cf. Andreozzi [2005], p. 
234) :  
“The question which is of central importance as much for social theory as for social 
policy is thus what properties, the rules must possess so that the separate actions of the 
individuals will produce an overall order. Some such rules all individuals of a society will 
obey because of the similar manner in which their environment represents itself in their 
minds. Others they will follow spontaneously because they will be part of their common 
cultural tradition. But there will be still others, which they may have to be made to obey, 
since, although it would be in the interest of each to disregard them, the overall order on 
which the success of their actions depends will arise only if those rules are generally followed 
(Hayek [1973], p. 45) 
 
The first type of rule to which Hayek refers corresponds to the rules that all individuals follow 
because they systematically emerge as an efficient and unique answer to concrete problems 
that they face when they are confronted with the same environment. The action of washing 
oneself everyday can be considered an example of this type of rule. Moreover, we can 
conclude that when individuals follow this type of rule, it does not result in a “social 
dilemma” type problem. The principle of profit maximization (in his ‘as if’ version) and the 
existence of non-social preferences (self-regarding) are quite acceptable to describe the 
generalization process of this type of rule.  
However, are they concrete or abstract rules? If we consider that for Hayek, abstract rules pre-
exist all perception of the qualitative variety of the world and all concrete experiences, in the 
causal sense of the principle of “primacy of action”, that is to say “in reference to what, within 
an explanation of mental phenomena, must come first and can be used to explain the rest” 
(Hayek [1978], p. 36), then all rules are of abstract nature and only the degree of abstraction 
varies according to the type of rules.   
As we have mentioned above, this approach reverses the traditional conception according to 
which the mind discovers abstraction and abstract rules (or regularities) based on the prior 
perception of reality but considers, on the contrary, that the starting point of the mental model 
is not the physical order of things that is falsely claimed as “scientist objectivism” according 
to Hayek (Hayek, 1953, chapitre V). In this perspective, it is in fact the combination of a 
certain number of abstract rules that makes it possible to perceive reality and to produce the 
details and particularities using a process that Hayek calls “specification by superimposition”.  
Individuals’ different concrete actions are then specified by superimpositioin of several 
abstract rules or dispositions, “which make an organism inclined to respond to stimuli of a 
certain class, not by a particular response but a response of a certain kind” (Hayek [1978] p. 
40). It is the joint effect of several pre-existing dispositions of the organism, that leads to the 
execution of a movement or a particular action, that is to say the selection among the different 
possible concrete forms, that which is the best adapted to the situation. If rules necessarily 
assume a general character, their degree of generality is apt to vary depending on the context 
and type of rule (more or less abstract) and according to an evolutionary process of rule 
selection.  
Moreover, these rules are often tacit and followed unconsciously; they are therefore hidden 
and eventually escape all linguistic expression and description. According to Hayek, one of 
the main characteristics of human behaviour consists of following rules of conduct and this 
characteristic must be carefully set apart from that of the individual’s knowledge of the effects 
of their concrete actions:   
“Normally following rules of conduct is a completely different ability than the 
knowledge that our actions will have a certain type of effect. Conversely, they should 
be viewed for what they are: the ability to slip into - or align ourselves with - a model 
of which we are barely conscious of its existence and for which we are hardly aware 
of the ramifications.” (Hayek [1993], p. 109). 
 
The second type of rules concern the rules of conduct shared by individuals having a common 
cultural tradition. They differ from the latter in the sense that they are characterized by 
degrees of abstraction and a higher rate of generalities.   
The process by which these rules become shared by the members of a same community can 
be explained, on the one hand, by the existence of a common mental structure of individuals, 
an assumption that makes it possible to lift the nondetermination relating to the Hayekian 
subjectivism and the impossibility of communicating and mutually understanding each other 
that logically results (Garrouste 1999, Birner 1999).  
Another possible justification for the sharing of rules reflects what Hayek calls the “social 
division of knowledge”. According to Hayek, the more a civilization develops, the more the 
society's knowledge becomes complex and specialized. The fact that knowledge is spread and 
localized in this manner favours the communities structured around a same tradition. Finally, 
Hayek admits that an individual's belonging to the same historic or socio-cultural environment 
favours what we can call shared individual beliefs. This viewpoint can be strengthened by the 
importance Hayek places on the articulation of innovative and imitative individual choices in 
the emergence of behavioural regularities. (Arena et Festré [2002], p. 541).  
These types of rules can also be interpreted, based on the game theory, as conventions 
according to Lewis (1969), that is to say, standards to which all individuals of a social group 
prefer to refer to as of the moment when (practically) all the individuals with whom they 
interact do the same. The example of a pure coordination game such as driving an automobile 
(right or left) is an illustration of this type of rule that can also be defined by its self-enforcing 
character, which, a priori, eliminates the possibility of social conflicts. In return, nothing 
guarantees that the convention followed by the individuals is Pareto-dominating (in the game 
of conduct, the two equilibriums are equal). In addition, in a situation of imperfect 
information, as indicated by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), only the risk-dominating equilibrium 
is stable. What is more, the convention retained is characterized by strong irreversibility (even 
if it is not irrevocable). 
 Finally, these types of rules can be put into perspective using the conformity theory 
developed by Bernheim (1994) and integrated into recent economic literature on social norms. 
In fact, this author develops, continuing on the intuitions of Duesenberry’s consumption 
theory based on relative income, the idea that individuals are sensitive and react as result of 
the relative income of their peers in their choice of consumption. Beyond their real income is 
the fact that individuals are also concerned with the social status that their choice of 
consumption confers upon them. However, social status depends on the perceptions of the 
individuals regarding the predispositions (and not actions) of their peers. Since 
predispositions are not directly observable, only actions can "signal" an individual's 
predispositions to another person and consequently, affect his social status. When 
preoccupation in terms of status dominates that of income or intrinsic utility, individuals can 
conform to a rigid standard of consumption, in spite of the heterogeneity of individuals' 
intrinsic preferences. In return, when the social status is less important, there is no conformity 
in terms of consumption behaviour. In spite of the analytical and methodological distance that 
separates Hayek's approach from that of game theorists, this perspective makes it possible to 
clarify the debates regarding the coherence and relevance of the Hayekian evolutionism. 
 
The third type of rules is by far the most interesting but also the most problematic. In the 
passage quoted above, Hayek refers to the third type of rules or norms that must be imposed 
because, although it is in the best interest of each not to respect them, the global order on 
which the success of each individual's actions depends, can be obtained or realized only if 
these rules are effectively followed.    
What are the characteristics of these rules and what types of difficulties do they present? 
Firstly, this type of rule, under the actual terms of the game theory,  refers to the problem of 
free-riding. Under these conditions, no mechanisms exist, based on methodological 
individualism and self-interest, which make it possible for this type of rule to emerge. It is one 
of the reasons, put forth in Hayek's comments, for which Hayek uses the argument of group 
selection. Hence, the examination of this hypothesis poses a problem at the moment it is put 
into perspective with evolutionist literature on group selection in biology. In fact, the most 
common argument in this literature is the supposition that the groups whose behaviour is 
characterized by a certain degree of altruism have a greater average ability (fitness) than the 
others and are therefore destined to outdo the latter, while within each group the non-altruists 
have a greater ability than the altruists (van Baalen et Rand, 1998)11. This point of view is 
difficult to reconcile with Hayek’s position regarding altruism. In fact, Hayek conceives the 
                                                            
11 Significant literature on biology exists relating to this problem that constitutes a serious matter: “When one 
individual behaves altruistically towards another, it increases the beneficiary’s fitness at the expense of its own. 
To explain how such behaviour can evolve has long been one of the benchmark problems of evolutionary 
biology.” (van Baalen et Rand [1998], p. 631). 
norms or institutions of the extended society as being an altruism economizer as it makes it 
possible for individuals to cooperate even if the latter are not concerned for their neighbours’ 
welfare. Far from favouring the advent of an extended society, the altruism hypothesis is 
conversely considered by Hayek as an obstacle to the formation of a social order as well as 
the source of the often debated unease of civilization (Hayek [1979], p.5, Hayek [1988], p. 
64) 
Typically, the latter form of rules or norms reflects on the problem of social dilemmas studied 
as part of the game theory.   
Hayek responds to this problem by invoking the sanction strategy, the application of which 
would reveal the existence of an extra-individual coercive constraint12: 
“A few observations may be added […] on certain peculiarities of social orders 
which rest on learnt (culturally transmitted) rules in addition to the innate 
(genetically transmitted) ones. Such rules will be presumably less strictly observed 
and it will need some continuous outside pressure to secure that individuals will 
continue to observe them. This will be in part effected if behavior according to the 
rules serves as a sort of mark of recognition of membership of the group. If deviant 
behavior results in non-acceptance by the other members of the group, and 
observance of the rules is a condition of successful cooperation with them, an 
effective pressure for the preservation of an established set of rules will be 
maintained. Expulsion from the group is probably the earliest and most effective 
sanction or ‘punishment’ which secures conformity (…).” (Hayek [1967], p. 78, 
underlined by us) 
 
In this passage, Hayek refers to the notion of sanction or punishment. One of the results of the 
developments of the game theory was to show that the punishment strategy only displaced the 
problem of free-riding previously evoked to a higher level. In other words, new possibilities 
                                                            
12 Meanwhile, the conditions for the existence of an agency specializing in the implementation of sanctions is of 
secondary interest for Hayek, as illustrated in the following passage:  
 
“[w]e are interested in any rules which are honored in action and not only in rules enforced by an 
organization created for that purpose. It is the factual observance of the rules which is the condition for the 
formation of an order of actions; whether they need to be enforced or how they are enforced is of secondary 
interest. (…) [I]f society is to persist it will have to develop some methods of effectively teaching and often 
also (…) of enforcing them.” (Hayek, [1973], p. 96, underlined by us) 
 
for social conflicts and therefore, strategic manipulation emerge during the effective 
implementation of the punishment strategy as the latter is costly.   
Certain recent models of evolutionary games (Witt 2001, Sethi and Somanathan 1996) show 
however that social norms presenting a problem of free-riding can be maintained thanks to the 
threat of punishment or reprisal even in the absence of reputation effects, which is typically 
the case with large anonymous groups. One of the reasons why only a fraction of the 
population of cooperative-aggressive agents – determined to implement (costly) reprisals in 
the case of another agent’s defection – survives resides in the fact that, in equilibrium, there 
are no agents in default in close relation to a cooperative-aggressive agent (cf. Andreozzi 
[2005], p. 238). 
However, neither the reward – punishment system, nor the imitation process or conformism 
explains the beneficial character of the norms13.  
Moreover, additional considerations in terms of reputation and self-reputation are also 
mobilized by Hayek, as suggested in the previous quoted passage, the notion of social 
acceptance or non-acceptance, which is to be linked to self-esteem: 
“All morals rest on the different esteem in which different persons are held by their 
fellows according to their conforming to accepted moral standards. (…) Like all rules 
of conduct prevailing in a society, and the observance of which makes an individual a 
member of the society, their acceptance demands equal application to all. This 
involves that morals are preserved by discriminating between people who observe 
them and those who do not. (…) I doubt whether any moral rule could be preserved 
without the exclusion of those who regularly infringe it from decent company – and 
even without people not allowing their children to mix with those who have bad 
manners. It is by the separation of groups and their distinctive principles of admission 
to them that sanctions of moral behavior operate.” (Hayek [1979], p. 1971). 
 
These intuitions are also corroborated by recent works in experimental economics. In fact, 
Fehr and Gächter (2000) as well as Carpenter, Bowles and Gintis (2006) jointly show, as part 
of an experience on the contributions of the members of a group to a public good, that 
cheating is costly for the agents and that the punishment strategy works (the agents tend to 
contribute more when the threat of punishment is real). The authors interpret this enigma in 
                                                            
13 “While punishment and reward can stabilize group beneficial norms, they can also stabilize any behavior.” 
(Boyd et Richerson, 2002, p. 288). Sugden (1993) also asks this question: “What is good about spontaneous 
order?” (p. 394) 
the following terms: one the one hand, the agents’ determination  to punish cheaters cannot be 
explained only by its direct effects on cheaters’ behaviour;  it is also motivated by the desire 
to impose a norm, even if it means incurring the cost, on a cheating individual with no 
expectation of a material benefit, whether personal or for another agent, which the authors 
qualify as an example of strong reciprocity. On the other hand, the reaction of the cheaters to 
the threat of punishment cannot be explained solely by the fear of having to bear a reduction 
in their income in the case of effective punishment; it is also guided by the feeling of shame 
on the part of the cheater in the case of non respect or violation of a social norm.   
Here, we can also refer to economic literature on social norms that attempts to provide an 
integrated analytical framework of the different motivations of economic agents (intrinsic 
motivations, extrinsic motivations or incentives, reputational motivations) making it possible 
to explain certain pro-social or anti-social behaviours considered enigmatic until now 
(Bénabou and Tirole [2006]). 
It is quite strange to note that, judging by the previous quoted passages, the explanation 
provided by Hayek for the reasons individuals adhere to norms, in no way refers to the notion 
of group selection. This idea is corroborated by Hayek and quoted by Sugden (1993), who 
seem to indicate that the principle of group selection does not play such an important role as 
generally claimed in his belief system:  
“ It would however be wrong to conclude, strictly from such evolutionary premises, 
that whatever rules have evolved are always or necessarily conducive to the survival 
and increase of the populations following them. We need to show, with the help of 
economic analysis, how rules that emerge spontaneously tend to promote human 
survival. Recognising that rules generally tend to be selected, via competition, on the 
basis of their human survival-value does not protect those rules from critical scrutiny.” 
(Hayek [1988], p. 20) 
 
Moreover, Hayek paradoxically never considers the opposite possibility, that is to say, a case 
where the social norms can emerge because they benefit the individuals and not necessarily , 
the groups.   
According to Hayek, one of the elements that explains the ambiguity or the vague and 
imprecise character of the notion of group selection resides in the singularity of his 
methodological approach.   
This approach is based on distinction, clearly emphasized by Hayek and already stated, 
“between the systems of rules of conduct that guide the individual members of a group (or the 
elements in any order) on one side, and the order or the structure of the actions that result for 
the group taken as a whole  (…). » (Hayek [1967], pp. 66). He adds that “in order to 
understand animal and human societies, distinction is particularly important since genetic 
transmission (and, to a great extent, cultural as well) of rules of conduct is done from 
individual to individual, while what we must call the natural selection of rules would function 
on the basis of the more or less great efficiency of the order that would result for the group”. 
(Ibid, pp. 66-7) 
The order of actions emerges from a logic of spontaneous order and takes on all 
characteristics: following rules, general predictive character, non predictiveness  from a more 
specific viewpoint, division of knowledge (cf. Sugden [1993], p. 395). 
It is also described as having a certain autonomy towards its constituents, that is to say the 
rules of conduct that lead to its emergence. This same type of autonomy is the basis for how 
the mind operates with regard to the operating rules:  
“The mind does not fabricate more rules than it is composed of action rules; that is to 
say a complex of rules that it did not create but that in the end guides the actions of 
individuals because when they are applied, their actions are more efficient, more 
successful than those of individuals or rival groups. [These rules] have flourished 
because the groups who practice them prospered more than the others and repressed 
them.” (Hayek [1980b], vol. 1, p. 21) 
 
This dual autonomy makes articulation between the two levels of rules complex, on the one 
side, the entire set of individual rules of conduct and on the other side, the entire set of action 
rules. Hayek’s analysis is based on the two levels of selection: an inter-individual selection of 
individual rules of conduct that ensure the survival of individuals and benefit them personally; 
a selection among the action orders that may result from individual rules. The articulation 
between these two levels is characterized by complex relationships rising from a logic of 
interlocking or an interwoven hierarchy. In the first place, this articulation is contextual so as 
a same set of individual rules of conduct can lead to varied social orders. Secondly, the inter-
individual selection of the rules of conduct through a learning process of trial and error 
(negative feedback) and by imitation (positive feedback) is dependent on the viability of the 
social order to which it contributes to produce (cf. Garrouste 1999 : 94). Thirdly, there is a 
gap between the strictly individual motivations of agents and the criteria which allows them to 
prefer one social order over another:   
“Most of the rules of conduct that govern our actions and most institutions produced 
from this regularity are as much adaptations to the impossible for anyone to 
consciously take into account all the distinct facts that comprise the society’s order.”  
(Hayek [1980b], vol. 1, p. 15). 
 
In other words, neither the existence of rules of conduct shared by individuals, nor the 
learning mechanisms by trial and error and by imitation are sufficient to determine the 
resulting one-to-one social order.  
If the analysis of the articulation between two levels of selection of rules makes it difficult to 
conclude on the dynamic properties of the resulting social order, it appears, a fortiori very 
daring to try to show the optimality of the market order as does Hayek. 
If Hayek’s merit is indisputable for having asked the fundamental question in social science, 
namely, understanding how social order exists and is maintained, and in particular how 
individuals’ actions can spontaneously be coordinated and give rise to a stable order or 
structure, nothing guarantees a priori that the different individual actions resulting from the 
different systems of rules of conduct of individuals will be adjusted and coordinated so as to 
result in a stable social order.   
As specified by Sugden (1993), Hayek’s analysis regarding the notion of spontaneous order 
lets us conclude on the feasibility conditions for human behaviour and social interaction and 
not on what is or should be desirable.  
Returning to the problems raised by several commentators regarding Hayek’s group selection, 
Sugden suggests that it could be more relevant to situate the unit of selection with the 
conventions or norms rather than with the levels of social groups. His argument is based on 
the idea that as part of the extended society as seen by Hayek, the historical or ethological 
origin of norms or conventions place less importance on mechanisms or conditions for their 
emergence and their distribution within and between social groups:  
“as soon as there is peaceful interaction between groups – for example, through trade 
or intermarriage – it become possible for conventions to spread from one group to 
another. And then the ‘fitness’ of a convention – its ability itself – becomes detached 
from the ability of human groups to replicate themselves.” (Sugden [1993], p. 402). 
 
This mutation of the analysis of the emergence and distribution of norms makes it particularly 
possible to make a link with several recent works on conventions already pointed out. It is 
true that in light of these works, the Hayekian theory of optimality of the spontaneous order 
has been challenged, for example in the blatant case of the QUERTY keyboard:   
“If we analyse how conventions establish themselves, and how one convention 
encroaches on another, we find that the processes of evolution favor those conventions 
that are best adapted to the transient conditions that prevail when no single convention 
is firmly established. These need not be the conventions that are most beneficial when 
universally followed.” (Sugden [1993], p. 401). 
 
Nevertheless, if these models for selection of norms or conventions tend to invalidate Hayek’s 
theory regarding the selection of the most efficient norms, they generally retain a unique 
homogenous population for analysis purposes of which the members are chosen at random. 
Hence, this framework does not seem to satisfactorily reconstruct Hayek’s view, according to 
which cultural evolution is the joint product of continuous learning by trial and error and 
experimentation in fields where several rival social orders confront each other (cf. Andreozzi 
[2005], pp. 234 et 240). 
One of Hayek’s more constructive criticisms consist rather of reconstructing originality, the 
scope and the actuality of his analysis of the emergence and distribution of norms that today 
are the subject of varied approaches in the field – for which we must emphasize the great 
heterogeneity – of the game theory or in particular the experimental economics theory.  
 
 
3. The Limits of the Hayekian Conception of Social Norms and the Resulting 
Perspectives. 
 
The limits of Hayek’s theories regarding the evolution of social norms take root on the one hand in the 
difficulty he has in thinking intentionality, and on the other hand, and consequently in his affirmation 
of the non intentional character of the emergence and evolution of social norms.    
The first limit has as a consequence a difficulty or even an impossibility of considering that social 
norms could be the result of intentional actions and it is otherwise for this reason that the best way to 
formalize the emergence of social norms and to use the initial models of the evolutionary game theory 
where individuals, programmed to play given strategies, are or are not selected. In this framework, 
they possess no intentionality.  
Hayek indeed has difficulty thinking intentionality as part of his analysis of the constitution of 
cognitive abilities. This comes from Hayek’s connectionist approach “that does not have the means to 
take the conscious and deliberate thoughts into account (or reasoning as a logical process).” (Smith 
[1999], p. 110). In addition, “The Sensory Order system leaves no room for planning, self-control or 
self-modeling of the conscious subject (no place, in fact, for a self or any ego or for a conscious unit). 
(ibid., p 111). This difficulty is found in the manner in which Hayek takes market operations into 
account.  
“Regarding the mind, such as the market system, the quantity of explicit knowledge 
(conscious) required by the agent so that he can react appropriately to changes affecting his 
circumstances is remarkably small. In the mind as in the market, the most essential 
information is conveyed in the form of abridged “signals” (that is to say, respectively in the 
form of neuronal impulsions and contextually situated prices).” (Smith [1999], p. 113)14. 
We therefore understand why society, the same as the mind, is necessarily opaque to the individual. 
This opacity is itself the consequence of Hayek’s theory regarding the construction of cognitive 
abilities that are extended to the operation of the market and society. This explains why Hayek 
focuses his attention on the self-organization processes to the expense of voluntary creation 
mechanisms. 
Hence, if we consider that, for Menger, the mechanism is at the basis of the emergence of currency as 
an organic institution, it is necessary that a group (maybe quite small) of individuals become aware 
that indirect barter (exchange of one good for another with higher exchangeable value) would be more 
beneficial than direct barter (exchange of one good for another that is needed). In this regard, 
                                                            
14 Cf. also A. Gifford Jr.: “In the brain, specialized areas contain specialized but decentralized knowledge that is 
coordinated by neural mechanisms in a manner similar to that done by markets and prices in economy.”  (2007, 
p. 270). 
Menger’s constant reference to the notions of knowledge and power (of realization and not 
constraints) illustrates that the conscience of the efficient action is an important element to be taken 
into account as soon as we try to explain the emergence of something new.  Hayek does not use this 
solution since he supports the analysis of the idea that the intrinsic ignorance of individuals is not only 
of their environment but also towards themselves (Aimar, 2007). This does not mean that Hayek does 
not introduce the idea of individuals’ innovative will but he cannot deduce it logically15 from the 
construction he proposes in The Sensory Order. 
This difficulty in logically passing from the analysis of the individual’s cognitive abilities to 
conscious action is revealed by Gifford (2007) who shows that consciousness of oneself is absent 
from The Sensory Order but appears in Law, Legislation and Liberty through the idea that individuals 
are responsible for their actions. This analysis, that is quite relevant, however does not solve the 
problem of the signification to be given to the isomorphic character of the analysis of the constitution 
of cognitive abilities and the coordination of individual action plans, nor that of moving between the 
first and second. Hence, this isomorphism is essential since it makes it possible to justify the fact that 
social norms appear as resulting from a spontaneous process. If this was not the case, this 
isomorphism would have a limited interest and would be only accidental. Hence, if we can believe 
that a neuron has no awareness of itself or its actions, it is difficult to formulate the same hypothesis 
regarding individuals. This does not challenge the coherence of the Hayekian approach but questions 
its relevance.   
If we can easily consider social norms, contrary most often to institutions, do not require organisms or 
organizations that ensure the implementation and proper functioning; there is nothing to affirm a 
priori that individuals’ will is excluded from their emergence and evolution. It is the idea developed 
by Sugden (1993) when he considers, surprisingly enough, that Hayek instills “contractualist” 
elements in his theory of spontaneous order. This highlights the necessity of an agreement (even 
assumed) between the individuals. 
The works of Avner Greif on the emergence of the coalition of Maghrebian merchants in the middle 
ages follows this same direction. They show, first of all, that this coalition is the result of the 
conscious actions of merchants and their agents, secondly is not linked to the existence of any 
authority or organization (it is self-enforced), and thirdly it is not part of any set of written rules. 
                                                            
15 This agrees with the viewpoint of Sugden (1993) : “Hayek’s approach to social theory is not, I think, a logical 
implication of his theory of mind ; but there is a clear analogy between the two.” (p. 415) 
Using a reputation model (therefore of repetitive games), Greif provides a proposal that shows the 
efficiency of the multilateral punishment system:  
 “In general a multilateral punishment strategy support cooperation when a bilateral 
punishment strategy fails to do so, due to the ability of each merchant to commit himself to 
rehire an honest agent by decreasing the probability that a cheater will be rehired.” (Greif 
[2006], p. 80). 
 
This allows Greif to falsify the idea of necessary spontaneity in a social order:  
“Yet, this private order was not, as advocates such as Friedrich A. von Hayek and Milton 
Friedman would have us believe, a result of ‘spontaneous order’ among economic agents. 
Rather, it was a product of intentional and coordinated efforts by many individuals – who were 
often economic as well as political agents with coercive capabilities.” 
 
Such an idea makes it possible to reintroduce the conscious character of individual actions in the 
emergence of social norms. Therefore, two modes of emergence of social norms exist, one is non 
intentional and completely in agreement with the Hayekian conception of spontaneous order, the other 
one is based on the will of individuals to constitute them without having an organism to implement 
them. This idea is strengthened by works relating to institutional design (Hurwicz, 1994) that defines 
the institution 1) as the emergence of rules of the game (North) or 2) as the equilibrium of a super 
game (Schotter) of “specific cases” of a mechanism conceived as a field of strategies to which we 
apply an income function to take the allocation of gains into account.  
The limits of the Hayekian analysis of social norms open a certain number of paths for research. 
The first is to study the specific modes of emergence of norms as being both the fact of individuals 
that intentionally attempt to construct rules to guide their behaviour and the (more or less) non 
intentional result of their actions. It is interesting to show that certain norms are voluntarily 
implemented as shown in the works of Avner Greif, secondly that others emerge non intentionally as 
defended by Hayek, and thirdly that hybrid forms of norms exist and result from the first two 
emergence modes. This would allow to emphasize the possible existence of phenomenon of 
complementarity or substitutability between the modes of emergence traditionally identified.  
The second is related to the notion that the emergence of norms could be independent of all individual 
characteristics, for example, altruism or kindness. In fact, several works show that individuals do not 
necessarily defend their own interests but can be others-regarding. The fact that the results of 
laboratory experiences of a game of ultimatum are not compatible with the perfect equilibrium in a 
sub game recently required the introduction of an altruistic hypothesis regardless of the manner in 
which this hypothesis is introduced. Even if altruism is not conceived as an intrinsic individual 
motivation, altruists can invade the egotistical population (van Baalen and Rand, 1998), and therefore 
altruism becomes a norm even if this strategy is not individually viable in a one-stroke game or in a 
classic evolutionary game. The path questions the altruistic economy defended by Hayek. 
The third path is based on the Hayekian difficulty of introducing individuals’ will and conscious into 
his connectionist cognitive conception. This point is essential because it is the subject of recent works 
in neuroeconomics and psychology. Kahneman’s theories regarding the brain is comprised of two 
systems: one is intuitive and the other controlled, showing that part of human actions are unconscious. 
We find similar results for the answer in terms of remuneration efforts as they are not consciously 
perceived. (Pessiglione et al., 2007) . Gifford (2007) also gives an account of neurological results that 
reveal the often unconscious character of human actions. All these works emphasize the challenge of 
the analysis of arbitrage between the conscious and the unconscious in individual decision-making.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have shown on the one hand that the Hayekian analysis of the emergence and 
evolution of social norms is coherent with his methodological principles and has been the subject of 
several theoretical and empirical validations. Meanwhile, we have developed the idea that this 
analysis poses a problem of relevance regarding certain hypotheses and mechanisms on which it is 
based. The emphasis of these weaknesses, that is to say 1) the problem of the absence of the logical 
relationship between the Hayekian vision of the constitution of cognitive abilities and his analysis of 
the social order; 2) the difficulty that his connectionist analysis leads to a belief of intentionality and 
individual will; 3) and his refusal to accept the intentional character of the emergence of social norms, 
has allowed us to identify new paths of research that are both important and promising.  
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